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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
DISPUTES-THE LAW-FACT DICHOTOMY
INTRODUCTION
Today, the typical Government contract contains what is known
as a "Disputes clause." I These clauses are not without historic precedent;
for many years now, Government contracts have contained clauses
which provided for their "finality" with respect to disputes arising
under them.2 In the well-noted 1878 case of Kihlberg v. United States,3
the leading case of its day, such a clause in a Government contract pro-
vided for:
... transportation to be paid... according to the distance from
the place of departure to that of delivery, the distance to be ascer-
tained and fixed by the chief quartermaster of the District of New
Mexico.
In this case the Supreme Court, facing the "finality clause" for the
first time,4 upheld it on the grounds that an agreement designating one
I. The current standard Disputes clause as found set forth in 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A,
cl. 6 (1964) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a
question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by
agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his
decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and con-
clusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the
Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a writ-
ten appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his
duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall
be final and conclusive unless determined by the court of competent juris-
diction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly
erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial
evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence
in support of his appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the
Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance of the contract and
in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
2. They were used as early as the Indian Wars. Because of inadequate communica-
tions to the rather inaccessible Far West, final responsibility for the payment of troop
supplies clearly had to test on the personnel in the field checking on their condition.
Hearings on H. R. 1838 and S. 24 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. at 19 (1954).
3. 97 U.S. 398, 400 (1878).
4. In an earlier case, United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868), a con-
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of the contracting parties to finally determine such matters was valid and
could not be reviewed by the courts except for "fraud or such gross
mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an
honest judgment. . . ... ' The implications of this holding will subse-
quently be seen.
It has been nearly a century since-Kilbberg or "dispute-type" clauses
have appeared in Government contracts, but events have caused a
substantial change in the field of public contracting, especially in the
last twenty-five years due to the tremendous growth in all areas of
Governmental activity. This growth has been characterized essentially
by four elements: 6 (1) annual expenditures in the billions of dollars,
(2) increasing dependence upon continuing expenditures by the private
sector of the economy, (3) the establishment in each government
agency of a permanent procurement organization which, under a maze
of statutes and regulations, awards and administers contracts and is en-
gaged in rule making and adjudication, and (4) the development of a
complex and voluminous body of Government contract law.
In deference to this transformation and the role that Government
contracting has assumed in our economy, this discussion will focus
attention primarily on the controversy of the "law-fact dichotomy" in
the finality of Government contract disputes as a central point about
which most, if not all, of the other problems in dispute settlement re-
volve. This purpose will be effectuated by an examination of the nature
of Government contracts, the present state of their dispute settlement,
the dialectic process by which Government contracts have arrived at
this current status, relevant problems in the area of judicial review, and
finally, a practical approach to dealing with these problems.
PRESENT STATE
Governmentt Conti-acts
In Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States,7 the Court of Claims
asserted:
tractor's voluntary submission of his claim to a "noncontractual" Government review
board and acceptance of payment pursuant to its decision was held to constitute agree-
ment that the board's decision was final.
5. 97 U.S. at 402. The "Kihlberg doctrine" was further spelled out in Martinsburg
& P.R.R. v. March, 114 U.S. 549 (1885).
6. Speidel, What Should The Law Schools Do About Federal Govermnent Contracts?,
18 J. LrGAL ED. 371 (1966). See generally Hannah, Government by Procuremzen,
18 Bus. LAWYER 997 (1963).
7. 347 F.2d 509 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966).
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When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes con-
tracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of
individuals who are parties to such instruments."
Despite the venerable court's statement, a more candid appraisal of the
situation would be that:
. . . it is perhaps not too much to say that when a business
concern steps into the field of Government contracts, it steps into
an area that, in practical terms, is a world of its own."
True, there are few theoretical differences between Government
contracts and private contracts; however, an enormous disparity is
found in the practical differences.' To begin with, in Government con-
tracts there is a marked absence of any real negotiations; they are often
mere "rubber stamps"-unilaterally-issued contracts of adhesion whose
terms, including the Disputes clause, must be accepted if one wishes to
do business with the Government as opposed to the more usual "give
and take" found prevalent in commercial transactions." The contractor
is handed a mass of small print, the nomenclature of which has been
amply termed "boilerplate." 12
In addition, there is the concept of the irrevocability of bids,'3 that is,
once a contractor has submitted a bid on a Government contract and
the bids have been opened, he cannot as a rule withdraw it.14 In the
8. 347 F.2d at 529.
9. Vom Baur, Differences Between Covmiercial Contracts and Government Contracts,
53 A.B.A.J. 247, 251 (1967).
10. For a discussion of the general similarities and differences between Government
contract law and private law, see generally CUNEo, GOVERNMENT CoNTrAcrs HANDBOOK
251-57 (1962).
11. Nor 'should the importance of unilaterally-issued regulations be underestimated.
See, e.g., Stone, Contract by Regulation, 29 LAW & CONT=EP. PROB. 32 (1964). Present-
ly, there is a trend from "procurement by negotiations" to procurement by formal ad-
vertising, especially in the Department of Defense.
12. These provisions consist essentially of standard clauses that have grown as the
needs of Government procurement have developed over the decades and are usually
found in a document entitled "General Provisions." In addition to the Disputes clause,
such others as the following are but a few of the more common clauses included that
provide for their equitable adjustment under the contract: "Changes", 41 C.F.R. 5§ 1-16.-
901-32, cl. 2 (1964); "Changed Conditions", 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-16.901-23A, cl. 4 (1964);
"Inspection", 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-16.901-32, el. 5 (1964); and "Termination-for-Convenience",
32 C.F.R. 5 8.701 (1961).
1S. Exemplified by ASPR § 2-304.
14. For a criticism of this rule, see generally Stezenmuller, Formation of Government
19681
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realm of private contracts, it is, of course, a well-known practice that
an offer may be withdrawn before aeceptance. 15
Next, as pointed out in the introduction, there exists a mass of regula-
dons which have the force of law.' In the main, the problems with re-
spect to these regulations arise not so much in their vastness or legality
per se, but in the alarming regularity with which they change. The ad-
verse effect of this awkward situation is felt in such instances as where it
is suddenly required that a certain clause be in a contract, and it is not
actually there. The contractor is, nonetheless, bound as if it were stated
in so many words.
The legal fiction that has evolved in Government contracts is the
"constructive change order," vindicated under the theory that as such
it was intended to be included in the first place.17 In the matter of
"Changes clauses," which are included as a norm in Government con-
tracts, contracting officers are empowered to make virtually any change
in the specifications, and contractors are obliged to comply. (This re-
mains true as long as such changes are within the scope of the contract,
but with respect to constructive changes, contractors are often in a
quandry as almost anything suffices for notice of change.')
These enumerated differences are but a few of the concerns involved
in Government contracts, but are the more outstanding ones. It is,
however, in the Disputes and Appeals clause that we find the main
distinction between Government and private contracts. With a private
contract, the matter is ordinarily quite simple; sometimes there are
provisions for arbitration, but usually one party brings suit for breach
of contract. Not so with Government contracts, for there are in addi-
Contracts-Application of Common Law Principles, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1955). But
see Pasley, Formation of Government Contracts-Application of Common Law Prin-
ciples-A Reply, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 518 (1955) for a justification of the rule.
15. 1 CoRBIN, CoNrTAcrs § 39 (1960). But see UWoaR, COMMERCIAL CODE art. II
(Firm Offer).
16. It was made abundantly clear that these administrative regulations are absolutely
binding on contractors in G. L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d
418, 320 F.2d 345, cert. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
17. For an analysis of the Changes clause with emphasis on constructive changes,
see generally Note, The Government Contract: Its Burdens and Benefits, 40 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 82 (1965).
18. Requests in letters, telegrams, or conversations, etc., may constitute such. Basic-
ally, they comprise any request, however informal, for additional work over and
above that required by the original contract. And then there are also specific types.
See generally Spector, An Analysis of the Standard "Changes" Clause, 25 Fr. B.J. 177
(1965).
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tion to claims for breach, those provided for and arising under the
contract- and these two classes of claims are mutually exclusive.'9
Claims arising under the contract can only be presented, as stipulated,
for negotiations to the contracting officer, who subsequently makes a
unilateral determination if no accord is reached.20 Under such circum-
stances, the contractor then has the allowed thirty days in which to
pursue an appeal to the relevant Board of Contract Appeals.21 It must be
noted that there has been a recent tendency to include numerous other
specific clauses in the contract and providing that such matters come
under the purview of the contract.
22
As to claims not arising under the contract, two forums are available
for "pure breach" and review of administrative decisions.2 3 These are the
various district courts and the Court of Claims, each of which has con-
current jurisdiction over the contract appeals involving claims for less
ihan $10,000 with the latter exercising exclusive jurisdiction over all
appeals entailing more than the $10,000 amount.24 Since friction has
emanated primarily from Court of Claims' decisions and as a relatively
large number of claims seem to concern more than $10,000, this analysis
will focus entirely on the Court of Claims vis ' vis the contract boards.2 5
19. For an excellent practical approach on how contractors ought to cope with
Government contract claims, see generally vom Baur, Remedies of Contractors with
the Government, 8 WAV. & MARY L. REv. 469 (1967).
20. See generally Hanes and Smith, The Contracting Officer: His Authority to Act
and His Duty to Act Independently, 70 DicK. L. REV. 333 (1966).
21. There are currently 18 Boards of Contract Appeals, largest of which in volume of
hearings is the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) which handles
close to 800-plus cases annually.
- 22. See note 12 supra.
23. Tucker Act (pure breach), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964); Wunderlich Act
(review on the theory that the Government breached contract by failing to accord
contractor all the compensation the contract legally entitled him) 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22
(1964).
24. Id.
25. Claims for breach can also be submitted to the Comptroller General, 4 Comp.
Gen. 404 (1924); Comp. Gen. B-155,343 dated 22 December 1964; Comp. Gen. B-155,936
of 5 February 1965, but there exists disadvantages, primary of which is that the GAO as
the "Government's guardian" will as a rule be counted on to take the Government's
side in any dispute. See generally Note, The Comptroller General of the United
States: The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust all Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L.
REv. 350 (1956).
Contracting officers also have the power purportedly to settle breach claims, Cannon
Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173 (Ct. Cl. 1963); but the Comptroller General
takes a dim view of this possibility, 44 Comp. Gen. 353 (1964).
A contractor, who otherwise has no avenue of relief available to him (as, for example,
where applicable statutes of limitations have run against him) may seek remedy by
1968]
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The Law-Fact Dichotomy
Turning to the dichotomy of law and fact,26 it has been no more
appropriatedly stated than that:
[nio two terms of legal science have rendered better service than
'law' and 'fact' . . . . They readily accommodate themselves to any
meaning that we desire to give them. In them and their kind a
science of law finds its strength and durability. They are the cre-
ations of centuries. What judge has not found refuge in them?
The man who could succeed in defining them would be a public
enemy.27
Notwithstanding these articulate words, no doubt the individual who
in some omnipotent manner could contrive an applicable definition
of these two terms could possibly prove of invaluable service in the
realm of Government contracts-if he did so for no other purpose than
in this area. While historically of some significance in delineating the
functions of judge and jury in our system of jurisprudence, 2 the law-
fact distinction, as it has been applied in the context of Government
contract disputes, has been for the most part policy-oriented.
The problem here arises essentially in the contract sphere where the
intent of the parties-most often characterized as a question of fact-
eventually will determine the outcome of most dispute cases. The con-
troversy centers on the extent administrative hearings and particularly
facts determined thereunder are binding on the Court of Claims con-
ducting a de novo review of the question. 29 As the standard Disputes
clause purports to be conclusive only on issues of fact, the boards have
asking Congress to pass a private relief act for his benefit, Public Law 89-681, 80 Star.
958 (1966).
All Government actions against contractors must be brought in federal district
courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).
26. For a general discussion of the problem of distinguishing between law and fact,
see generally Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899 (1943).
27. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930); quoted by Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions
of Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 239, 240 (1955). Basically, a "finding of fact," while neces-
sarily an inference based on evidence and not an absolute reality, is "a description of
a phenomenon independent of law making or law applying." Id. at 242. Law making
is the "authoritative choice from among known or possible modes of conduct... " Id.
at 247.
28. 9 WVIGMORE, EvIDFNcE § 2549 (1940).
29. Because the contract jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is original rather than
appellate, such an attack takes the form of a trial rather than that of a direct appeal,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964).
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tended to treat questions of contract interpretation as questions of fact
and broaden the term "breach" for their inclusion in the process;30
while on the other hand, the Court of Claims has regarded them as
questions of law and so construed finality clauses narrowly.31
The Mandate of Utah Construction Co.
In United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.,32 the Supreme Court
was confronted with two issues relevant to the above discussed law-fact
conflict. The first of these was the question of whether or not all factual
disagreements relating to a Government contract, including those in-
volved in a claim for pure breach as well as those in a claim arising
under the contract, must be determined pursuant to the directives of the
Disputes clause. The second issue involved whether, in the event the
first issue was decided in the negative, a board's decision on a fact prop-
erly before it in a claim arising under the contract would nonetheless
be binding on the Court of Claims in deciding a breach claim entailing
the same factual situation.
To the first inquiry, the Court ruled that the Disputes clause was man-
datory provisions only in those instances where specific contract adjust-
ment provisions provided for administrative relief, reaffirming the his-
torical dualism of Government contract remedies. The Court's decision
was based on:
[a]n examination of uniform continuous, and long-standing judicial
and administrative construction of the dispute clause . . . [which
established] . . . that the jurisdiction of the Board of Contract
Appeals under the dispute clause was limited to claims for equitable
adjustments, time extensions, or other remedies under specific con-
tract provisions authorizing such relief and accordingly . . . the
contractor need not process pure breach of contract claims through
the disputes machinery before filing his court action.33
With respect to the latter question, the Court of Claims found itself re-
versed, the Supreme Court adversely holding to the effect that where a
30. Randolph Engineering Co., ASBCA no. 4872, 58-2 BCA para. 2053, 1 GC 118.
31. WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1963); United
States v. Lundstrom, 139 F.2d 792 (Ct. Cl. 1943); Gerhard F. Meyne Co. v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 811 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
32. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
33. Id. at 404-05. See, e.g., Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. C1. 603,
629-30 (1937); Ekco Products Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 768, 773 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
1968]
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claim in which a Board of Contract Appeals could properly give some
form of relief is first brought before the respective board as a dispute
and then subsequently appealed to the Court of Claims on a breach of
contract theory, the court is nevertheless bound by the Administrative
record made before the board. This view was stated as follows:
It would disregard the parties agreement to conclude, as the Court
of Claims did, that because the court suit was one for breach of
contract which the administrative agency had no authority to de-
cide, the court need not accept administrative findings which were
appropriately made and obviously relevant to another claim with-
in the jurisdiction of the board.34
It seems a bit pro forma for the Court to have relied on this particular
interpretation of the Disputes clause in 1966 after the multitude of
cases that had preceded Utah, for there does not exist in its language
anything that actually gives much of an insight one way or the other
35
But upon further scrutiny of the Court's decision, it soon becomes ap-
parent what its real motive was in this instance; its real basis was
the realization that contractors could circumvent the finality of any
board findings altogether by merely changing the theory of their case.
The Court pointed to this distinct possibility by stating that:
... any claim, whether within or without the disputes clause, can
be couched in breach of contract language. The contractual and
statutory scheme would be too easily avoided if a party could
compel relitigation of a matter once decided by mere use of
semantics.36
However, recognizing that this possibility would also conflict with the
established dualism of remedies, the Supreme Court had already (just
prior to Utah) expressly rejected this position in Morrison-Knudsen v.
United States,37 which kept such matters within the scope of the Dis-
34. 384 U.S. at 419.
35. Standard Disputes clause, see note 1 supra.
36. 384 U.S. at 419. The court pointed out that the simple addition of the ad-
jective "unreasonable" for example could in and of itself change the connotation of
a claim from "contract" to "breach."
37. 345 F.2d 833 (Ct. Cl. 1965). When the contract makes provision for equitable
adjustment of particular claims, such claims may be regarded as converted from breach
of contract claims to claims for relief under the contract. See Kelly, Government Con-
tractors' Remedies: A Regulatory Reform, 18 AD. L. REv. 143, 147 (Fall ed. 1965).
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putes clause where based on contract. And in light of Morrison-Knud-
sen, its assertion in Utah is seemingly nothing more than mere re-
dundancy.
But notwithstanding this fact and more important in its overall impli-
cations, Utah was basically a reaffirmation of what the Supreme Court
had previously asserted in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,38 that
judicial review was limited to the administrative record, and henceforth,
there were to be no de novo trials on claims over which a board had
jurisdiction, in the absence of fraud, etc. Following Bianchi, considerable
confusion developed concerning the scope of review-did it exist and,
if so, to what extent-with the Court of Claims endeavoring to avoid
application of the "Bianchi rule" in several cases, 39 distinguishing them
mainly on the basis of the Government's alleged failure to make timely
objection to the introduction of new evidentiary material and asserting
that the rule was procedural and evidential, not jurisdictional in nature.
In addition to the reaffirmation of Bianchi by Utah, there has also
since been in United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc.,4 ° a clarifica-
tion of what was deemed implicit in the Bianchi decision by a holding
that since a court action with respect to a contract claim within a
board's jurisdiction was appellate in nature, the court itself could not
add evidence to an administrative record which was incomplete or de-
fective; rather the reviewing court should refer the case back to the
board for perfection or, in extreme cases, enter summary judgment.41
To have a full appreciation of the position which Utah has reached,
as well as the ensuing problems which will be considered, it is neces-
sary to look at the historical process from whence it has evolved.
38. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
39. J. D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Garner Dis-
plays Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Kings Electronics Co. v. United
States, 341 F.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 322
(Cr. Cl. 1965); WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United Stares, 337 F.2d 861 (Cr. Cl. 1963).
40. 384 U.S. 424 (1966).
41. The Supreme Court also noted that there may be occasions when the parties
will not be required to exhaust the administrative procedure, but "these circumstances
are clearly the exceptions rather than the rule and the inadequacy or unavailability of
administrative relief must clearly appear before a party is permitted to circumvent his
own contractual agreement." Id. at 430.
In another subsequent case, H. R. Henderson & Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 CCF
para. 72,884 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 22, 1965), it was held that the appealing contractor did not
have to introduce into evidence the entire administrative record, that a use of only a
part thereof did nor constitute a de novo hearing.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
During the Civil War, the Secretary of War appointed a Board of
Commissioners who, with approval of the contractor, were vested with
authority to finally decide the amount owing under a contract.4 2 There-
after, during the period in which Kihlberg was decided, until the turn
of the century, such single-stage Dispute clauses appeared and con-
stituted the norm. Around 1900, a two-stage type of Dispute clause
began to show up in Government contracts, which provided, not only
for an initial determination by a contracting officer, but also for an
administrative review by the respective secretary (or head) of the
governmental department concerned or in lieu thereof another appro-
priate official designated in his place.43
During this same period, the Court of Claims was undergoing its
initial growth as well. Just six years prior to the Secretary of War's
creation of his board, the Court of Claims was created by statute in
1855. 4 Initially, the court's authority was limited to the investigation
and determination of facts in order to make recommendations to the
Congress. In 1863, a statute was enacted intending to grant the court
the power to enter final judgments without congressional involvement,4
but such judgments were construed by the Supreme Court as not being
conclusive and consequently not subject to judicial review.4' Finally, an
1866 enactment was promulgated,4 7 which overcame the objections .4
It was but a mere decade later, while the court was still in its in-
cipient state, that it passed judgment on the Kihlberg case to the effect
42. United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868).
43. Barlow v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 514, aff'd 184 U.S. 123 (1902); Ripley v.
United States, 223 U.S. 695 (1912).
44. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. The Court of Claims was originally
established in response to problems similar to those which led to the creation of con-
tract boards-the need for an institution which could give effective trial-type hearings
to aggrieved contractors. For a general discussion of the origins of the Court of
Claims and its evolution into its present form, see generally Evans, The United States
Court of Claims, 17 FED. B.J. 85 (1957).
45. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765.
46. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (12 Wall.) 561 (1864).
47. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
48. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886). 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964) provides
that the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment "upon any claim
against the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the
United States. . . . For a discussion of the types of cases handled by the Court of
Claims and the manner in which it so does, see generally Wilkinson, The United
States Court of Claims: Where Uncle Sam is Always the Defendant, 36 A.B.A.J. 89
(1950).
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that the decision of the Chief Quartermaster on the measured distances
involved-even though clearly erroneous-was not reviewable on the
premise that the parties had agreed in the contract that this -determina-
tion would be final.49 At this time, no review standards were discussed
or even seemingly contemplated by the Court of Claims. The implica-
tions of Kihlberg at this point meant that the judicial remedy granted by
the Congress could be retracted by the Government through the simple
insertion of "Kihlberg-type" Disputes clauses in Government con-
tractsY0 But despite being supposedly "final and conclusive," the Su-
preme Court realizing the human element concluded that such determi-
nations therefore were not always free from "fraud or gross error, etc.";
and with its affirmation of Kihlberg, it afforded the Court, of Claims the
basic aforementioned criteria for review standards5 1 The "Kibi erg
scope of review" was enlarged and expanded through the years by the
Court of Claims itself until it arrived at the position where it would
take review if an administrative decision was "arbitrary," "capricious,"
or "so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith." 252
The first Boards of Contract Appeals proliferated during the First
World War and managed to gain considerable experience, but the post-
war era saw virtually all of these boards lapse. However, with the
advent of World War II, enormous developments and pressures were
wrought in the disputes field; and it was at this time that the Court of
Claims in Penker Constr. Co. v. United States- overturned a decision by
an Assistant Secretary of War on the grounds that he had not properly
handled an appeal brought under a Disputes clause. The repercussions
from this case resulted in an administrative study from whence it was
decided that contractors would henceforth be entitled to a hearing
commensurate with the right to present evidence to a Board of Con-
tract Appeals, setting the stage for our present-day system5 4
Following on the heels of this decision, the basic "rule" of administra-
tive law was alluded to in the 1946 case of United States v. Joseph A.
49. 13 Cr. Cl. 148 (1877).
50. Cuneo and Anthony, Beyond Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace on
Judicial Review of Contract Appeals Boards Decisions, 55 GEO. L.J 602, 605 (1967).
51. 97 U.S. at 402.
52. See, e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
,aff'd per curianz by an equally divided court, 340 U.S. 898 (1950) for a liberal standard
of review.
53. 96 Ct. CI. 1 (1942).
54. For an early analysis of the origins of contract appeal boards, including juris-
diction and practice in contract appeals during World Wars I & II, see generally
Smith, The War Department Board of Contract Appeals, 5 FED. B.J. 74 (1943).
1968]
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Holpucb,5 which enunciated the premise that a contractor must first
exhaust all of his administrative remedies, where such are available,
before seeking other modes of redress.a The ruling in Morrison-Knud-
sen, as reiterated by Utah, was essentially a strong reindorsement of
this position.
The evolution of the Court of Claims from a trial court of contract
claims to a review court thereof was witnessed in the early fifties, aris-
ing almost wholly from the adamant position taken in two cases. In
United States v. Moorman57 the validity of a Disputes clause (a special
"all Disputes clause") which made final agency's decision on an issue
of law as well as on fact was upheld. Moorman was followed in short
order by United States v. Wunderlich5s which cut back the above cited
standards of permissive review afforded administrative decisions to
"fraud, alleged and proved" meaning "conscious wrongdoing, an in-
tention to cheat or be dishonest . . . ." 11 Limiting review authority to
search exclusively for conscious fraud on both legal and factual issues,
these two cases, for all intents and purposes, practically eliminated the
Court of Claims' involvement in Government contract disputes.
Such an outcry from all quarters' immediately followed the Moor-
man and Wunderlich decisions that the Wunderlich Act"' was quickly
promulgated, the express purpose of which was to overcome these two
cases and particularly Wunderlich. The first section of the Act reversed
the Wunderlich decision by enlarging the standards of review to what
the Court of Claims previously had been permitted and added the "sub-
stantial evidence" test.62 The second section abrogated Moorman by
55. 328 U.S. 234 (1946). The judicial relitigation of an issue decided administratively
frustrates the use of the Disputes clause as a "mechanism whereby adjustments may
be made and errors corrected on an administrative level, thereby permitting the Govern-
ment to mitigate or avoid large damage claims that might otherwise be created." Id.
at 239.
56. DAvis, A nD.INIsTRATiVE LAW Tx x S 182 (1951).
57. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
58. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
59. Id. at 100. ". . . if the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited that
is a matter for Congress." Id.
60. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Conmmittee on the
Judiciary, Review of Finality Clauses in Govermzent Contracts, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 3, 81 (1954).
61. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
62. Id. 5 321 provides:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating
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asserting that an administrative decision on a legal issue possessed no
finality whatsoever.6s But even with the added "substantial evidence"
test,"' the Wunderlich Act was less a guide than an admonition to
improve the state of administrative records made by the boards-negative
enforcement-as it professed more concern with review standards than
procedure, which had to wait until Bianchi.
With the reincarnation of its former status (plus the addition of the
"substantial evidence" test)," the Court of Claims once more functioned
as a true nisi prius court.68 But with definite standards of review set,
the question of how they should be applied soon arose. In Volentine &
Littleton v. United States, 7 the Court of Claims explicitly held that
restoration of the status quo ante included the court's admission of
de novo evidentiary material. However, during this same time (refer-
ence having to be made to the district courts here), various dis-
to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any depart-
ment or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute
involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any
suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision
to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board
is alleged: Provided however, That any such decision shall be final and
conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported
by substantial evidence. (Emphasis added.)
63. Id. § 322 provides:
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a
question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative
or board.
64. That administrative decisions must be supported by "substantial evidence" was
the novel ingredient of the Wunderlich Act. It was essentially borrowed from the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §
1001-11 (1964), and federal labor regulations, meaning as enunciated by Chief Justice
Hughes in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) that "substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
65. The Court of Claims in eroding the scope of review allocated by the Supreme
Court in Kihlberg had endeavored earlier to utilize the "substantial evidence" test but
was confronted with a per curiam reversal in United States v. John McShaine, Inc.,
308 U.S. 512 (1939) and subsequently again in United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S.
457 (1950).
66. Wagner Whirler & Derrick Corp. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 664 (Cr. Cl. 1954).
67. 145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956). Certiorari was not sought in Volentine; however,
when the identical issue was decided a year later in Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States,
151 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 877 (1957), the Justice Depart-
ment unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
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trict and circuit courts of appeals restricted court review to the ad-
ministrative record, construing the Wunderlich Act to be so intended.68
Viewing the inconsistency, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
Court of Claims' attitude on this matter and finally in Bianchi granted
certiorari, asserting that the Act did in fact limit judicial review to the
administrative record.6A Once again considerable furor developed in
the wake of this holding; legal periodicals offered lengthy comment,7"
congressional legislation was introduced to overrule the decision spe-
cifically,71 but apparently the evil did not seem as great as Moorman and
Wunderlich. Actually, here again as with the Disputes clause, the
Wunderlich Act on its face does not purport to make board decisions
on facts binding,72 but only serves more as an incentive to improve the
condition of administrative records to be subjected to judicial scrutiny,
particularly by use of the "substantial evidence" test.
So Bianchi, as supplemented by Utah, has currently set the stage in
the Government contract dispute arena, establishing somewhat of a
still uncertain modus vivendi between the boards and the Court of
Claims. In its decisions since Grace, the court has been so far con-
comitant, recognizing that when relief is available to a contractor under
the Disputes clause he is not entitled to a de novo trial on factual ques-
tions administratively decided. 73 But by the same token, there has also
already been litigation to the effect that only the "ultimate" fact is bind-
ing and not "evidentiary" findings unless absolutely indispensable to the
"ultimate" fact.74
68. Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963); Lowell 0. -West Lumber Sales v. United States, 270
F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959); Hoffman v. United States, 276 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1960); Wells
& Wells v. United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959).
69. 373 U.S. at 715.
70. See, e.g., Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of
Administrative Determination of Governmzent Contract Disputes, 29 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 115 (1964).
71. H. R. 289, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): A Bill to Amend the Act of May 11,
1954 [ch. 199, § 1, 68 Stat. 81; 41 U.S.C. 321 (1964)], to provide for full adjudication of
rights of Government contractors in courts of law.
72. § 321, see note 62 supra.
73. See, e.g., Midwest Spray & Coating Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 354-64 (July
15, 1966); Jefferson Constr. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 67-65 (July 15, 1966);
Banks Constr. Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 17-64 (July 15, 1966); Allied Contractors,
Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 255-61 (July 15, 1966).
74. This view seems to have been recognized by the Court of Claims in Newport
News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 310-64 (March 17,
1967).
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Ostensibly so, it is no small conjecture to say that the question posed in
administrative review are by no means resolved, especially with re-
spect to the problems exacerbated by this dualism in Government con-
tract dispute remedies, to which attention will now be directed.
PROBLEM AREAS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES
The distribution of responsibility between the administrative boards
and the judiciary has resolved certain major problems and accentuated
others at the same time, most of which have already been reasonably
inferred, if not overtly manifested, by the previous discussion.
Resolved on the surface of things are the problems of affording
contractors a relatively speedy and inexpensive remedy through the
medium of the boards by way of the local contracting officer, providing
judicial relief where none is administratively available, and the main-
tenance of judicial surveillance on the entire litigation process.
Faced with the distinct possibility of having their court actions dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as stipulated by
Holpuch, the usual process which contractors followed before Utah
was to present all claims relevant to the contract first to the appropriate
board, getting what administrative relief they could, and then to the
court for de novo hearing. As a wrong guess in the first place might
have foreclosed all remedies, nothing was lost by appealing a board's
interlocutory decision where the party was dissatisfied, especially where
novel evidence could be introduced. This practice amounted to a second
chance in effect. Cognizant of this fact, another motive underlying the
Bianchi and Utah decisions was to enhance the "finality" of the Disputes
clause where applicable by encouraging contractors to make a complete
disclosure at the board level rather than withhold evidence for a sub-
sequent court review.75
The practical problems germane to the law-fact dichotomy which
have been occasioned by the endeavors to define jurisdiction and scope
of review in Government contract disputes can be reduced into two
basic spheres. The first of these concerns, "fragmentation and remand,"
has been particularly effectuated by the latest decisions; the second,
"administrative expertise versus judicial surveillance," has been existent
for most of the Disputes clause's history, but has assumed added signifi-
cance in light of the current mandate.
75. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [l
Fragmentation and Remand
Bianchi meant that a contractor could no longer conveniently "pack-
age his claims" neatly together for a complete hearing by the Court of
Claims, but that each of the two types of claims-pure breach and
administrative review-must be handled by the court under its two
respective types of jurisdiction. The effect of all this procedural differ-
entiation has been termed "fragmentation of remedies," 7 a state of
affairs which is borne out in such instances as witnessed in the Utah
case where claims arose both for breach and under the contract simul-
taneously.
Before, as mentioned, a contractor could usually await the expedient
handling of his case at the board level and then have matters relitigated;
or he could as an alternative concurrently prosecute each of his claims,
anticipating that his board action and Court of Claims remedies would
be concluded in a quicker manner. But now, the effect seemingly is
that court proceedings cannot be effectively held until completion of
the administrative hearings where common facts are involved with the
contractor having dual claims, which is often the case. The unanswered
question is whether a pure breach claim must be stayed in such instances
pending the conclusion of board hearings.7 And then there are the
difficulties associated with the additional time involved in scrutinizing
the board's decision to ascertain if it conforms to the criteria set forth
in the Wunderlich Act.
This latter fact necessitates dealing with the corollary problem of
remand. The confrontation here centers on the questions of when the
court may itself alter a decision of a board, entering judgment, and
when it must return the case for further proceedings to the deciding
board due to some deficiency in the administrative record-on some
unspecified theory as the traditional doctrine is that the Court of Claims
has no power of remand, but can only suspend its proceedings and await
76. Id. at 718. But see, Universal Ecsco Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl.
1965) in which the Court of Claims permitted the contractor to bring all claims
direcdy to the court for a de novo trial on the ground that the claims arising under
the contract were insignificant in comparison with the breach claims. Cf. United
States Steel Corp. v. United States, 367 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
77. See generally Crowell & Anthony, Practical Problems Facing Contractors'
Counsel as a Result of Fragmentation of Remedies, 18 AD. L. REv. 128 (Fall ed. 1965).
78. Another vexing aspect of this problem concerns the statute of limitations and the
splitting of causes of action. See Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847 (Cr.
Cl. 1966).
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voluntary rectification by the board involved.79 Viewing the situation
in a realistic manner since the Court of Claims is in fact a nisi prius
court well equipped to conduct evidentiary trials and not strictly an
appellate court, one might ask why the court shall not be allowed to
go ahead and make a determination on its own in such instances. It is
already a well-established theory that where an administrative remedy
is inadequate or unavailable, a direct proceeding in the court may be
maintained.80
The problems invoked by fragmentation and remand also have had a
tendency to make more pronounced the twin effects of time and ex-
pense in litigation"' and their complement, the statute of limitations,,"
in determining the proper course of action for contractors to pursue.
Administrative Expertise versus Judicial Surveillance
The second sphere of problems centers about the desire to reap the
fruits of "administrative expertise" (meaning essentially the expediency
of the boards) 83as opposed to the American jurisprudential tradition of
adherence to judicial surveillance.84
Referring to the administrative mode of redress, it has been stated
that, "the administrative process leaves much to be desired." 'd This broad
79. United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641 (1949). See generally Jaffe, Remand Powers
in the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 444 (1966). However, Mr. Jaffe argues that the
traditional doctrine is a misreading of dicta and could be reversed by the Court of
Claims itself.
80. H. B. Zachry Co. v. United States, 344 F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965); C.J. Langenfelder
& Son, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600 (Ct. C. 1965). But see United States v.
Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966) and preceding text, infra.
81. Processing and trial of a breach claim may begin as a rule only two to four
years after completion of the board proceedings which themselves average fourteen
months. And with remand, there is, of course, an additional time element. See Crowell
& Anthony, supra note 77, at 139.
82. See generally Comment, Mandatory Administrative Proceedings and Statute of
Limitations in Government Contract Cases: A Three-Way Conflict, 53 VA. L. REv.
150 (1967).
83. There is some view to the effect of the inaptness of "administrative expertise"
argument in contract interpretation. See Note, United States v. Carlo Bianchi &9 Co.:
Finality Under the Disputes Clause, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rr.v. 290, 308-09 (1964).
84. Judge Madden, who wrote the ill-fated Court of Claims' opinions in Wunderlich,
Volentine, and Bianchi, objects even to the quasi-judicialization of the contract boards,
as he views their role as but the last stage in negotiations. See generally Madden,
Bianchi!s Ghost, 16 A. L. REv. 22 (1963).
85. Roberts v. United States, 357 F.2d 938, 944 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Although the Court
of Claims has generally been quite critical of the administrative due process followed
in dispute cases, it has dealt with the problem only rarely. For one such instance,
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generalized statement points up the basic crux of the problem that
specifically concerns the matter in which board cases are facilitated
and the administrative record for review produced.
The so-called 'administrative record' is in many cases a mythical
entity. There is no statutory provision for these administrative
decisions or for any procedure in making them. 6
As suggested in the above statement, there has been much consternation
over the fact that the various contract boards were specifically exempt
from the dictates of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of
1946,7 primarily in view of the situation that their jurisdiction arises out
of contract and not statute. As such, there does not exist any set pro-
cedures for the Contract Boards of Appeals. Although many of the
boards have, in fact, published detailed rules of procedure, there, none-
theless, exists a serious lack of uniformity, running the gamut from the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the most in-
clusive,"" to the Department of Commerce which has none whatsoever.
The legislative history of the Wunderlich Act indicates that one of
the compelling reasons for the inclusion of the "substantial evidence"
test was to encourage improvement in administrative proceedings by
the boards and the records arising therefrom under the Disputes clause.
This intent was duly consummated in Bianchi, where Justice Harlan
held that the various agencies concerned must "make adequate pro-
visions for a record that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny," 89
since it was "clearly part of the legislative purpose to achieve uniform-
ity." o Quite clearly, the Supreme Court through its own instrumentality
of adjudication was endeavoring to stimulate due process at board hear-
ings, since by legislation the boards were not so bound. But upon tak-
ing note of the board proceedings and practices utilized in their eviden-
tiary hearings, one has serious misgivings if the efforts of the Supreme
where the court was severely critical, see Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. United States, 347
F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
86. Volentine & Littlcton v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 952, 954 (1956).
87. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964). S 1001 3(a) excludes
"agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organiza-
tions of the parties to the dispute determined by them." 5 U.S.C.A. S 551 (1) (E) (Supp. I
1966).
88. 28 Fed. Reg. 9348 (1963).
89. 373 U.S. at 718.
90. Id.
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Court have had any effect. An analysis of the most exemplary of these
boards, the ASBCA, shows this observation to be correct.
In comparison with the criterion set forth in the APA, it can be seen
that the ASBCA does not even have all the hearing powers as provided
for under section 7 (b) of the Act, which means for the most part that
there is no machinery for the taking of depositions (especially for
discovery), the compulsory production of documents, application of
the subpoena power, or the administering of oaths.9' Furthermore, the
board may search out on its own and consult other documents of possi-
ble relevance, and there are no assurances that the testimony and ex-
hibits will constitute the exclusive record for decision.92 As a result,
he who hears might not be the one who decides. Also lacking is the
granting to involved parties the opportunity to submit either proposed
findings and conclusions or exceptions to a recommended decision.a3
In view of the insufficiency of safeguards provided for in the procedure
of the better, if not the best, of the boards, it can readily be seen why the
Court of Claims has been so vehement in exerting its prerogatives.
In light of the mandate as set forth in Bianchi and Utah, one asks what
can be done to preserve the practical advantages of "administrative ex-
pertise" and at the same time fulfill the requirements of due process
while preventing the fragmentation of remedies and the questions posed
in remand.
CONCLUSION
It can be questioned whether any analytical approach to the law-fact
distinction could be effectively applied in Government contract dis-
putes, especially since claims do not always come neatly labeled "breach"
or "contract" in the first place. This distinction, as it has been used
by the boards and the Court of Claims, has not only delineated the
scope of review, but also defined the jurisdictional lines between these
bodies. As such, the dichotomy has served as a battleground of preroga-
tives.
To be constructive, one must be more than negative; and to this
proposition, it is submitted that what is needed is not so much a defini-
91. The boards have no statutory authority for administering oaths, but the False
Claim Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1958) or False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958)
are usually read as a substitute to witnesses taking the stand.
92. APA at 7 (d).
93. Id. at § 8(b). These are procedures which may facilitate the joinder and reso-
lution of law and fact issues.
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tion of the terms but a reform of the mechanics of the dispute procedure,
so that the dichotomy itself becomes merely rhetorical and of academic
interest. To this end, it is proposed that a practical two-pronged ap-
proach utilizing the existing disputes machinery be considered 4
The conflict in Government contract disputes has been largely the
product of unplanned growth and of existing mechanisms reacting
ad hoc to rectify the immediate shortcomings. But inasmuch as the
vast majority of claims have managed to be satisfactorily adjusted at the
administrative level, and congressional study focusing on the problem
has concluded that "existing boards" are "doing a pretty good job and
appeals are handled with reasonable fairness," 95 any solution should en-
deavor to retain the existing boards insofar as possible, making only what
have been deemed "necessary reforms" to cover those arising where
now applicable.
First, specific internal recommendations should be followed. These
would include the further expansion of the contractual basis for relief
to bring as many matters as possible, including those for breach, within
the scope of the contract, thus aiding in eliminating the possibilities of
fragmentation."' Next would be the necessity of establishing guidelines
for administrative due process. Although there is merit to the contention
that adoption of the APA per se would be more of a hindrance, as it
was not designed to operate in the contract dispute process, 7 at least,
by legislation or by the various agencies themselves (which possess the
power), rules could be promulgated effecting certain parts of the APA
as to specific needs, providing in the process a uniform set of board prac-
tices.
And lastly with respect to this first facet of reform, the function
of judicial review should be clarified. The Court of Claims, under its
broad rule-making powers, 8 could in and of itself effectuate the neces-
sary changes here, so that pursuant to contract board decisions, it would
serve as an appellate court and thereby eliminate a needless duplication
of hearings as well as subscribing a measure a finality to administrative
94. For a treatment of sundry other proposals and the expostulation of yet another,
see Note, Government Contract Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73 YALE L.J.
1408, 1450-58 (1964).
95. S. Doc. No. 89 at 131.
96. For comment on possible problems in adopting an "all-encompassing Dispute
clause," see 160 Fed. Cont. Rep. A-8 (March 13, 1967).
97. Id. at A-1 for the position of the Department of Defense on this view.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964).
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decisions." This measure would also help to prevent fragmentation in
such instances where it is now prevalent.
Under such a revitalized scheme, the court could still reserve its
nisi prius jurisdiction where no administrative relief is available and to
pure breach claims, meaning essentially those claims that could not
be provided for under contract. Contractors who claim violation of
Wunderlich Act standards in board determinations would be required
to show a reasonable basis for their contentions to a Court of Claims'
commissioner before being afforded a hearing in the court itself.'10
In the second place, in answer to those who feel that a formalized set
of procedures would no longer insure contractors a speedy and in-
expensive remedy-the main attribute in retaining these boards-there is
submitted an option formula whereby a contractor could elect in his
appeal to the respective board concerned between either an informal
proceeding, as is currently conducted, or a formalized proceeding in-
corporating the aforementioned suggestion for procedures. With a for-
malized hearing, the Court of Claims should have no qualms about the
administrative record with improved standardized procedures. And on
appeal from an informal hearing where the contractor has shown good
cause as prescribed above, the Court of Claims could return the case to
the concerned board for clarification on specifics and on all matters
which require a formalized hearing or in extreme cases enter direct
judgment itself as Grace seemingly suggests.
It can be reasonably surmised that the majority of contractors, who
with their vested interest of maintaining their "economy of profits,"
will want their disputes resolved as quickly as possible. Since they are
required under the Disputes clause to continue work during the pro-
ceedings, it only seems natural that they would prefer an informal hear-
ing with its flexibility, which for the most part would adequately serve
its purpose as it has in the past, knowing of course that the alternative
of judicial review is available if they are justifiably dissatisfied.
It is felt that by such a practical approach, the fundamental criterion
in Government contract disputes can be met inasmuch as the basic ob-
99. Finality of board decisions, at least where satisfied, is also very important to con-
tractors, particularly relevant to review by the GAO, Hearings, supra note 60, at 92-3.
100. In some of its recent proceedings, the Court of Claims has already required a
detailed statement of alleged errors of law supposedly committed by the involved board
as well as a list of specific findings that are contended not to be supported by sub-
stantial evidence. See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, Ct. C. No. 277-56 (July 15,
1966).
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jective of the disputes machinery, i.e., the resolution of the dispute at
one hearing, can be maintained; administrative due process would be
available to ensure a fair and efficient determination of the issues in-
volved; and the fundamental safeguard of judicial review will be pre-
served.
Gary E. Legner
